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COMBINING TENSE AND 
TEMPORAL EXTENSION: THE 
POTENTIAL OF BERGSON’S 
‘QUALITATIVE MULTIPLICITY’ 
FOR CONQUERING 




There is an astonishing gap between our natural temporal experience and 
a theoretic analysing of temporal phenomena.1 By “theoretic analysing” I 
mean both the analysis and the conceptual account of temporal experience 
itself and giving an objective description of time in metaphysical respects. 
The starting point of this paper is that one crucial difficulty for both 
fields is to combine — on the theoretical level — two aspects of temporal 
experience, namely, tense and temporal extension.
In the following section, I will specify these notions and explain why 
I take them to be naturally given together in our intuitive temporal 
experience. The third section shows that in theoretical reflection, however, 
those aspects often appear to be opposing each other. This is significantly 
mirrored by contemporary metaphysics and, in particular, by the positions 
1. More than one philosopher has come across this gap: Think for instance of Augustine, 
Zeno of Elea and J. M. E. McTaggart.
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of a B-theoretic eternalism that conceives temporal extension without 
tense and an A-theoretic presentism that is inclined to conceptualise 
tense without temporal extension. In the light of this, I would like to 
present Henri Bergson’s analysis of temporal experience as an alternative 
perspective on the matter (section four): here we will find his conception 
of “Qualitative Multiplicity” to be an extraordinary instrument for coping 
with the tension between tense and temporal extension by construing 
extension on a qualitative level instead of a numerical one. In my opinion, 
this conceptual account of temporal experience is convincing because it is 
consistent with the intuitions that I will elaborate in section two.
Section five asks if Bergson’s notion of qualitative multiplicity (and hence 
of qualitative temporal extension) can be of any use within a metaphysical 
context. I will propose that at this point two different directions of 
metaphysical reasoning are open for discussion: to consider qualitative 
multiplicity either to be purely subjective or else to be a feature of the 
world as such (in some way that still remains to be clarified). The first 
option of these two, which I take to be Bergson’s metaphysical thesis of 
Time and Free Will, is elaborated in section six.
I will criticise, however, the latter in section seven by revealing a problem it 
has with regard to continuity. Following this, I will maintain that it is not 
problem-free to conceive any part of reality as merely tensed and not at all 
temporally extended. This result strengthens the motivation to combine 
tense and extension even in the field of objective description of temporal 
reality and hence pursuing the second strategy of expanding further the 
idea of qualitative multiplicity. I take this to be a promising perspective 
for establishing a metaphysical account of time that fits with our natural 
temporal awareness by bringing together tense and temporal extension.
I. Experiencing Succession: Tense and Extension
How to describe appropriately the most striking feature of our temporal 
experience, moments succeeding each other? The aim of this paragraph 
is to demonstrate that the phenomena of singularity and multiplicity of 
moments are intertwined here in a peculiar way. When we experience 
temporal phenomena — let us assume we wait for the sugar to dissolve in 
the glass of water, to pick up the famous example from Bergson (Bergson 
1944, 12) — we have a concrete experience of succession. 
On the one hand, it is crucial that all moments of this process are by 
no means given to us together: when the sugar is half-dissolved, we can 
Combining Tense and Temporal Extension… 35
neither find any longer pure water and sugar in its original constitution, 
nor can we yet enjoy the prepared drink. A characteristic feature of the 
successive experience is the respective singularity of a special moment in an 
island position, i.e., the present, which is incessantly replaced. Referring 
to the debate between A- and B-theorists (that I will touch upon in the 
next paragraph) I call this feature “tense” by which I mean the outstanding 
singularity of the present moment and its incessant replacement. Tense in this 
sense apparently is crucial for experienced succession: moments are given 
to us “one by one.”
On the other hand, the example is just as much suited to evoke a second 
intuition. This experience of witnessing the sugar dissolving in the glass 
includes access to the events directly as a whole process, as a sequence of 
interconnected moments. This seemingly immediate experience of a process 
also requires to be acknowledged in a characterisation of succession: it 
brings to the table the intuition of understanding succession as an interplay 
of numerous moments and their mutual relations. From this point of view, 
we need a concept of temporal extension in order to allow for the feature that 
processes take place. I would like to understand “temporal extension” as a 
very broad term here. What I mean by it for a start is the plain and simple 
fact of more than one moment being given — in some way. How then one 
gives a more precise meaning to the term “given” will be precisely one crucial 
feature of a respective conception of temporal phenomena (both within the 
field of the analysis of temporal experience and of metaphysics of time).
Note that both the expressions “one after the other” and “one by one” are 
synonyms for “successively.” Succession apparently involves the interplay 
of many moments as well as the unique position of a respectively special 
moment. C. D. Broad labels those two characteristics as the “Extensive 
Aspect of Temporal Facts” (Broad 1976, 267) and the “Transitory Aspect 
of Temporal Facts” (Broad 1976, 271).
II. Analysis of Succession (in Experience of Time and Metaphysics): 
Tense vs. Extension
What is the problem? Following the phenomenology of our temporal 
experience given so far, both tense and extension emerged as crucial 
aspects of succession. The obvious approach would be to implement both 
aspects within an appropriate conception of time experience and also to 
take them at least as a starting point for metaphysical reasoning about 
time. Well, the tension between the two intuitions lies in the opposition of 
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“one” and “many.” Every account of temporal succession — both within 
the context of subjective and of objective time — must face the challenge 
of clarifying how it is to be understood that on the one hand numerous 
non-simultaneous moments are “given” (in some way or other) while on 
the other hand respectively, one present moment is essentially “given” in 
a singled-out way (and this will be the opportunity, by the way, to come 
back to defining the meaning of “given”).
Experience of Time
Within the context of analysis of temporal experience, this topic is typically 
made a subject of discussion in conjunction with the question of how 
experienced succession relates to objective time (see Dainton 2017, 97.). 
The fact that the tension between the (present) “one” moment and the 
“many” moments (involved in the experienced succession) emerges within 
this context is due to the “common sense doctrine that our immediate 
experience is [objectively speaking] confined to a momentary (or near-
momentary) present” (Dainton 2014, 101). Based on Dainton’s work, three 
general categories of structuring the issue have become standard: (1) The 
“cinematographic” or “snapshot” view attributes to every single moment of 
experience solely the experience of a single moment and hence the perception 
of a changeless state.2 (2) The “retentional” view of experienced succession 
holds that the experience itself is (objectively speaking) momentary and 
durationless, while the content of experience comprises by contrast many 
moments at once. (3)  Finally, the “extensional” view takes both the 
experience itself and its content to be extended (Dainton 2017, 98).
Note that every category is able to comprise different subtypes. For the 
issue discussed in this paper, it is especially noteworthy that by grasping 
the content of experience as extended (as both retentionalists and 
extensionalists do) we have not yet given any information about how these 
numerous moments of temporal extension are given together. (Are they 
to be understood on a par? Are all of them perceptions or some of them 
memories? etc.) Indeed, there are different suggestions for this: Husserl for 
instance, after whose conception the “retentional” view has been named, 
thought of an experience of the near fading past moments as “Retention” 
being involved in the present experience (Husserl 2002, 382-388, 404-
406). Dainton, a contemporary proponent of an extensionalists view, 
2. Strictly speaking this view fails to be a real account of “experienced succession” since 
all that remains to experience is (respectively) simultaneous (Dainton 2014, 101).
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suggests an overlapping model in order to specify how different moments 
are experienced together (see Dainton 2000, 162-182). Note that an 
essential challenge for answering this question is (again) how the fact of 
more than one moment being given “together” in some way goes together 
with the aspect of the experience of the singularity of the present, hence 
what exactly the interplay of tense and extension is.
Metaphysics of time
The question becomes even more pointed in the area of metaphysics 
and more precisely when it comes to ontological commitments about 
temporal reality within the scope of analytic time metaphysics. Is the real 
world temporally extended in the sense that events of different times exist 
together one way or another? Does this go together with a tensed view of 
reality that takes the present to be metaphysically relevant? To advocate 
a certain temporal ontology in this context typically goes hand in hand 
with two claims: (a) taking a stand concerning the question of whether the 
present is to be taken as metaphysically relevant and (b) defining the range 
of temporal locations that existing things/events are allowed to have. 
The respective stand concerning (a) concerns what we called tense above 
and separates so-called A-theorists (who ascribe tense to the objective 
world) and B-theorists (who deny this ascription), this notion going back 
to McTaggart’s seminal paper “The Unreality of Time” (McTaggart 1908). 
The respective claim with regard to (b) obviously comes along with a stance 
concerning temporal extension as we defined it above (understanding 
“given” in this metaphysical context as “existing”). 
Presentists, for instance, claim (b) that present things (or events) are the 
only ones to exist and hence declare a single moment to be the base of 
their ontology. By this, they are already committed to answer (a)  in the 
affirmative, since singling out the present as solely existing obviously is one 
way to ascribe metaphysical relevance to it. Hence, presentists advocate an 
(a) tensed and (b) not extended ontology. 
Some A-theorists (such as Moving-Spotlighters) make an effort in order to 
join tense and temporal extension and, hence, to advocate an (a) tensed 
and (b) extended ontology. In this case, however, they carry the burden 
of coping with McTaggart’s problem: McTaggart’s so-called “A-series” 
consists of past, present, and future events. By undermining its consistency 
McTaggart precisely casts doubt on the possibility of combining the aspects 
we focused upon: grasping events as tensed on the one hand, i.e., being 
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characterised in dependence of an outstanding present, and treating them 
on an equal footing on the other hand, i.e., locating them in a shared 
dimension. That is why many A-theorists, namely presentists, forego 
temporal extension in favour of tense (see for instance Craig 2003, 391-
408, 391-392).
On the other hand, B-theorists, denying (a), seem to have no choice 
concerning (b) but to enlarge the scope of their ontology maximally. If the 
notion “present” (and dependently the notions “past” and “future”) are not 
allowed to be relevant objectively, there remains no instrument for sorting 
out any special moments from the ontology: all moments are treated on a 
par. So, every B-theorist is a so-called eternalist, advocating an (a) tenseless 
and (b) (maximally) extended ontology.
So, we find that combining the aspects of tense and extension poses a 
certain challenge within the field of theoretical analysis of temporal 
experience and even tends to be an unattainable goal within the field of 
temporal metaphysics. It is, however, astonishing that two aspects that 
seem naturally embedded within our experience of time turn out to be 
incompatible on the theoretical level. Let us re-examine the phenomena 
carefully and encounter an alternative analysis with Bergson’s philosophy.
III. Qualitative Multiplicity: Extension within the Tensed Present
The focus of this paper is Bergson’s idea of “qualitative multiplicity.” As 
we will see, this concept, stemming from his analysis of our temporal 
experience in Time and Free Will, succeeds in combining both intuitions, 
extension and tense. The essential point of Time and Free Will is to analyse 
the temporal structure of our experience, i.e., its duration (durée), and to 
show it to be totally different from spatial structure, even contrary to it.
For Bergson, the experience of music is an excellent example to demonstrate 
our experience of temporal phenomena in general (Bergson 2001, 105). 
Here it becomes very clear that successive impressions are at the same time 
singled out and given together in a peculiar way:
When we listen to a melody, we have the purest impression of succession we 
could possibly have, — an impression as far removed as possible from that 
of simultaneity, — and yet it is the very continuity of the melody and the 
impossibility of breaking it up which make that impression upon us (Bergson 
2007, 124).
Imagine yourself sitting in the concert hall listening to the last act of Richard 
Wagner’s opera Tristan and Isolde. The hall is full, even after four hours of 
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listening hundreds of ears are strained, the microphones are switched on 
transmitting simultaneously to the radio live program. At any moment 
of time, both ears and microphones “receive” the respective sounds of the 
orchestra, the voices of the singers, the little coughs from the audience 
unsuccessfully stifled. Every split second is loaded with a singular, well 
defined stimulus that emerges in the presence of this very moment and 
vanishes in the following. In this description again, I chose to focus upon 
the aspect of tense. With respect to the outstanding present, we might 
say that we share the way of accessing the sound with the microphones, 
i.e., every stimulus is given by itself. However, this account would never 
describe our whole hearing experience in a satisfying way. Rather, hearing 
the sounds as a melody apparently arises only in some way or other from 
the tone’s synergy.
This synergy, namely, characterises a piece of music. The melodic relations 
between the successive sounds, the iterations of motives, the building up 
and resolving of tension are essential to it. All this, we could say, is already 
given as a whole at any moment of the concert: Fixed and written down 
it lies in front of every musician in the form of the sheet of music. But 
still, as it was dissatisfying to compare our listening experience with the 
occurrence of a microphone receiving sound, it seems equally wrong to 
say that we hear the tones structured in the way they are written down on 
the sheet of music, i.e., given together as a whole. Again, it turns out that 
successive structure is more complex than either singling out the present or 
else summing up the whole lot of successive elements.
Bergson’s solution for grasping this structure is the concept of a “continuous 
or qualitative multiplicity” (Bergson 2001, 105). According to this idea, 
the durational experience constitutes an ongoing manifold of conscious 
states without them being a sum of divisible and countable elements. 
Bergson rather says that they “permeate one another” (Bergson 2001, 
106). Hence, what from spatial contexts is well-known to us as a sharp 
contrast, namely one and many, within the durational consciousness turns 
out to be mediated as a qualitative heterogeneity of the present experience 
(Spateneder 2007, 40). The idea is that the experienced present only is what 
it is, against the background of the previous moments. Hence, within the 
experience of the presently perceived tone lies somehow the experience of 
the previous tones as well. When the famous “Tristan-chord” (Hartmann 
1989, 36-52) is replayed in the final act of Tristan and Isolde, it obviously 
does not sound the same to the audience as it did at its first occurrence in 
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the opening phase of the opera, being a leitmotif leading you through the 
whole work.3 Let alone for the resolution of this dissonant chord: for more 
than four hours the audience has been following various devolutions of 
the Tristan-chord to other unresolved dischords, having compassion with 
Tristan’s tensions and longings and waiting for its release. When it finally 
comes to its resolution to B major, you cannot but hear this as resolution, 
not comparable to perceiving the sound of a harmonic B major motive on 
another occasion, say in your piano lesson.4
What it comes down to is that the previous moments play a role within the 
present listening experience, namely they constitute a kind of qualitative 
imprint. Therefore, the present moment never stands totally by itself, rather 
it cannot but form a qualitative diversity in which the whole continuous 
succession — and hence many other moments — play a necessary role. 
However, this permeating manifold of many moments does by no means 
form a multiplicity in a quantitative sense. The last would mean that they 
were numerically many, each of them an element separable from the others 
and describable on its own. Rather, we can admit that in a certain sense (as 
I will say “numerically”) there is just one moment, namely the present. This 
moment, however, is essentially characterised by its being intertwined with 
the successive many. I would like to illustrate the structure of qualitative 
multiplicity with the help of the following picture:
FIGURE 1. Qualitative Multiplicity of the Present
3. As Wolfram Heicking puts it: “[N]o chord on its own has a special effect! It needs a 
particular constellation in order to render a chord noticeable and even an event. […] 
What matters is what has been before, how the chord is placed, and what comes after” 
(Heicking 2018, 73 my translation, emphasis in original).
4. I am thankful to Maja Menzel whose musical knowledge helped me to find and 
execute this example.
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The magnifier is meant to express the qualitative perspective. With respect 
to how the present is presented to us within our experience, the continuous 
whole of successive moments is relevant.5 Regarding an object through a 
magnifier we see something new, not visible from the normal perspective, 
which, however, already belongs to the object: it is not a matter of an extra 
that comes on top of the object itself. This detail actually is important for 
Bergson’s view. As I read him, he doesn’t think our experience of duration 
is such that there is an actual content of experience plus a content of 
memory representing the former content of experience (Bergson 2007, 
125-126). Rather, the actual experience itself is not conceivable without 
the qualitative imprint of the past.
I claim that in terms of the contemporary approaches to the analysis 
of temporal experience presented in section 3, we are dealing here 
with a retentional view. While the experience itself is from the outside 
instantaneous, it does indeed comprise a certain temporal extension with 
regard to content.6 However, the highlight of the conception is precisely 
that the manifold of moments given within the experience is not a sum — 
neither of numerous impressions, nor of impressions and memories etc. 
but rather a qualitative imprint of the single present experience. That is 
why I find the expression “retentional view” — even if accurate with regard 
to the definition of section 3 — a bit misleading: Bergson’s approach does 
not include any kind of “retention” in the sense of an entity that is separable 
and/or independent of the present impression.7
5. The design of a spiral relates to the image of a growing snowball that Bergson employs 
once for duration (Bergson 1944, 5).
6. Dainton agrees that such a retentional reading of Time and Free Will is possible. His 
own rejection of this interpretation is based on the difficulty he sees in reconciling it with 
Bergson’s later work, Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution (Dainton 2017, 98). 
Since I believe that Bergson’s thought undergoes a remarkable change between his earlier 
and his later work, I suggest interpreting Time and Free Will independently in this respect.
7. Husserl, for instance, contrary to Bergson, applies the notion of a strictly actual 
impression, the so-called “Urimpression,” which refers to nothing but the reception of the 
very present stimuli, that is (in some way) given together with “retentions” (Husserl 2002, 
382-388, 404-406). I am not entirely certain of how the interplay of the Urimpresssion 
and the Retentions is to be understood in terms of — to use Bergson’s terminology — 
quantitative or qualitative multiplicity. The fact, however, that Husserl does at least 
distinguish the two notions on a theoretical level differs from Bergson’s view. If this is a 
difference rather in emphasis or in substance leaves to be clarified on another occasion.
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IV. Qualitative Multiplicity and Metaphysics?
Combining tense and temporal extension was seemingly a problem for 
contemporary time metaphysics. In the previous section we saw that 
Bergson’s notion of qualitative multiplicity — which, according to him, 
is how we experience succession — succeeds in combining those features 
by conceptualising temporal extension as a qualitative feature of the tensed 
present: The way how the present moment is given to us includes its past.8 
Could this structure possibly be useful for a metaphysical conception of 
time? The obvious challenge for a switch to metaphysics is the following: 
when exposing temporal extension as a permeating manifold of qualitative 
imprint, we seem to deal with a notion belonging to the sphere of subjectivity 
while the metaphysical debate concerns objective temporal reality.
Actually, what we saw until now could be the starting point for two different 
directions of reasoning, resulting in two contrary metaphysical theses. We 
could firstly use Bergson’s analysis as a cornerstone for a conception in 
which temporal extension is understood as something purely subjective. 
Or secondly, we could think about somehow transferring the structure 
of qualitative multiplicity into objective being. In my opinion, Bergson’s 
philosophy provides inspiration for both ways, spelling out consequences 
of the first idea in Time and Free Will and resourcefully supporting the 
second in his later work. In this paper, I focus upon the first option. 
However, not because I find it more convincing, I rather go through the 
conception of Time and Free Will (perhaps even in an intense reading that, 
from a metaphysical point of view, goes beyond Bergson’s own intentions) 
as a kind of insightful intermediate step: This conception spells out the idea 
of purely subjective temporal extension on the one hand and objective, 
extensionless tense on the other hand. My focus will lie on the problems 
which arise from this position and which I take to be a strong motivation 
to pursue the second option in the long run.
Note that this point — to ask if temporal extension is rather to be 
understood as objective or subjective — is quite a remarkable starting 
point of metaphysical reflection in the face of the debate between A- and 
B-theorists portrayed above, their core question being the following: “[I]
s reality tensed, or does it only appear tensed to us?” (Dolev 2007, 4). 
Apparently, in the light of Bergson’s analysis of our experience of time, we 
8. I restrict myself to taking into account past moments, since the role of future moments 
is certainly more complex and linked to further open questions that I cannot discuss here.
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rather find ourselves faced with the reversed question: is reality temporally 
extended, or does it only appear temporally extended to us?
V. The Tensed, Non-Extended Outside Realm of Time and Free Will
In my view, Time and Free Will does not focus as much on metaphysical 
questions as Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution do. The opening 
question of this first book of Bergson’s is — as the original title tells us — 
what the immediate data of consciousness are. By means of this question, 
Bergson follows the deeply empiricist conviction that our conscious 
experience has to be the cornerstone of philosophy. Nevertheless, in the 
end this can be taken to be a metaphysical approach for good reasons. 
Namely, in Time and Free Will Bergson explicitly considers just this — 
what is immediately given to our consciousness — as real (Bergson 2001, 
110). This criterion leads Bergson to two different spheres: “we have to do 
with two different kinds of reality, the one heterogeneous, that of sensible 
qualities, the other homogeneous, namely space” (Bergson 2001, 97).
Hence, if we take this to be a serious metaphysical statement, which I will 
for the sake of this paper,9 the result is a dualistic conception of reality 
which distinguishes strictly between an inner realm given to the conscious 
Self (structured by qualitative multiplicity) and an outside world (to which 
we have to ascribe a purely spatial structure) (Bergson 2001, 110).
Continuous succession in the form of qualitative multiplicity — and, 
hence, the qualitative temporal extension of the present — is indeed 
restricted to the subjective part of reality. On the contrary, the structure 
of the outside world is strictly simultaneous, hence there is no temporal 
extension.
What duration is there existing outside us? The present only, or, if we prefer the 
expression, simultaneity. No doubt external things change, but their moments 
do not succeed one another […] except for a consciousness which keeps them in 
mind. We observe outside us at a given moment a whole system of simultaneous 
positions; of the simultaneities which have preceded them nothing remains 
(Bergson 2001, 227 emphasis in original).
Note that the reality of the outside world is restricted to the present 
moment in such a radical way that any reference to other moments (even 
as past ones) is out of the question. Bergson’s statement “nothing remains” 
9. Since my target is to express a systematical point about the consistency of a certain 
ontological structure, it is not essential to my argumentation whether Bergson postulates 
this ontology explicitly or not. 
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makes it quite clear that the outside realm does by no means comprise 
any structure that allows for history or memory of the past. At a given 
moment, the outer world just is there as it is, full stop. Nothing can or has 
to be said about previous states in a description of the spatial realm.
Certainly, this conception of the outside is actually designed in a tensed 
manner. At different moments, we find the external world in different 
states, respectively. This means that the validity of any given characterisation 
of the outer world expires from moment to moment. Nevertheless, the 
momentous characterisation of the external is all that there is at this 
moment. Hence, confronting Bergson’s position with the notions of 
contemporary metaphysics of time, we can describe his conception of the 
outside reality as a presentist’s view and — as such — as a tensed and non-
extended conception of the temporal reality.
Note, however, that this position, excluding any reference of the present 
moment to other moments, apparently is a presentism of unparalleled 
radicalness: Usually, presentists are not averse to acknowledging, in 
some way or other, the fact that the present state is embedded within the 
successive overall structure.10 In particular, relating to the so-called debate 
of “Grounding Past Truths” (Kierland 2013, 173), they often admit the 
need for integrating the states of affairs of past moments in any manner 
into their presentist ontology. This can be achieved, for instance, by the 
idea of having so-called past-directed properties included within the 
present reality, as John Bigelow states in the following quote: “The past no 
longer exists; yet there is a sense in which the past can never be lost: the 
world will always be one with the property of having once been thus and 
so” (Bigelow 1996, 47).11 
Bergson’s view of the outside reality, by contrast, results in a more radical 
version of presentism, since past times and states of affairs are consequently 
faded out. Every present is imagined like a flashlight, it stands for itself and 
will vanish without trace in the very next moment. Since no connection 
can be established between past moments and the present one, Bergson’s 
conception of the external reality does not leave any room for the fact 
that the actual state does play a role in a successive framework, even if it is 
clearly tensed in the sense that it is real just for the actual moment. That 
10. An exception is Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (cf. Ingthorsson 2017, 106). 
11. See also Prior 1959, 14.
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is why we cannot even speak of succession in this part of reality,12 as Bergson 
himself emphasises: “Outside ourselves we should find only space, and 
consequently nothing but simultaneities, of which we could not even say 
that they are objectively successive” (Bergson 2001, 116).
VI. The Lack of Continuity
What advantages and disadvantages does this extraordinary conception 
show when faced with contemporary time metaphysics? A strikingly 
attractive feature of Bergson’s dualistic conception is that it succeeds in 
bringing together the intuitions of tense and temporal extension without 
getting entangled into contradictions. The extensionless, radically presentist 
outside reality, on the one hand, is not vulnerable to inconsistencies à 
la McTaggart. Temporal extension, on the other hand, is rooted — as 
subjective — within the realm of the conscious Self and, hence, explains 
in which sense time is given to us as tensed and extended. Because of the 
very special structure of the temporal extension involved here, i.e., the 
qualitative multiplicity, this temporal manifold of many moments does 
not, however, conflict with the outstanding role of the tensed present. 
Temporal extension is a purely qualitative feature of the respective 
consciously experienced presence.
Note that this ontological structure can be taken to be a mirror-inverted 
opposite model of an eternalist ontology: eternalism choses temporal 
extension to be the structure of the objective outside reality. By contrast 
then, tense is placed within the sphere of subjective perspective. As 
opposed to Bergson’s view, eternalism does, admittedly, not result in 
a dualistic picture because eternalists are not normally inclined to take 
the sphere of subjective perspective to be a separate part of reality. At the 
same time, Bergson makes obviously a greater effort to account for the 
extensional subjective perspective than eternalists usually do to account 
for the tensed subjective perspective. Hence, Bergson’s approach pays 
more attention to our temporal experience and, just by doing so, probably 
succeeds better than eternalism in explaining away the intuition that time 
is — metaphysically — both, tensed and extensional.
12. This may be confusing at first sight: Actually, we do speak of succession in the outside 
world, don’t we? The fact, however, that we can grasp the tensed structure of the outside 
as succession, goes back to the duration of our inner realm (where, on the contrary, it is not 
the case that “nothing remains” of the simultaneities which have preceded the present one).
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I see, however, a crucial problem within this conception of Time and 
Free Will: I believe that conceiving the external realm as merely tensed 
and not as temporally extended results in an unacceptable deficiency of 
temporal continuity. More than that, it will turn out that, due to this lack 
of continuity, it is not convincing after all to separate tense and temporal 
extension in the manner described, and hence to conceptualise any part of 
reality without temporal extension.
To see this, let us have a closer look at the notion of the tensed external 
world. We have identified its tense in the sense that different states are 
never given together but rather respectively. The addition “respectively,” 
however, is crucial because tense is not only the fact that we are dealing 
with a single moment of time, but also the fact that this single moment 
somehow changes and is replaced by another moment. Here is what 
Bergson offers on the subject of this aspect of tense within the realm of the 
external world:
Hence, we must not say that external things endure, but rather that there is in 
them some inexpressible reason in virtue of which we cannot examine them 
at successive moments of our own duration without observing that they have 
changed. But this change does not involve succession unless the word is taken in 
a new meaning (Bergson 2001, 227).
We see here that Time and Free Will indeed assumes the tensed change of 
moments within the external realm and also touches on the issue of it. It 
does not, however, contribute anything to understand this phenomenon 
better or even to account for it. More than that, Bergson actually leaves 
the change of moments explicitly unanalysed by making reference to 
“some inexpressible reason” for it. Hence, Bergson merely ascertains 
that the simultaneous space as given to us within one moment of our 
durational experience is not the same as the simultaneous space given to 
us within another moment. He remains, however, silent about what may 
be happening between those two different moments of consideration. 
Ironically, the Time and Free Will conception of the outside is described 
accurately by a description that Bergson himself employs in Creative 
Evolution as a critique of a metaphysically distorting approach, namely the 
one of mathematical methods. There he says: “the world the mathematician 
deals with is a world that dies and is reborn at every instant” (Bergson 
2001, 27).
What renders such a view apparently unconvincing is the lack of 
any possibility of establishing a continuous connection between one 
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moment and another. Consequently, Bergson in Time and Free Will has 
no instrument to establish continuous movement or change within the 
external world (Miquel 2007, 58-59). Movement, such as succession, is 
only real within the realm of the conscious Self (Bergson 2001, 110-115). 
It becomes clear now in which sense the results of this conception are kind 
of awkward. On the one hand, the outside world consists of a respective 
single instant, and we even assume about this realm that any instantaneous 
state of affairs is somehow replaced by others. On the other hand, our 
experience has the structure of continuous succession, and we experience 
movement and change (not least seemingly occurring to external states of 
affairs if those are involved into our continuous experience). Nevertheless, 
none of this is taken to be real within the external world.
Here is what I take to be the most interesting insight from this dissatisfying 
awkwardness. Tense is not easily conceivable without continuity after all. 
Namely, in order to truly understand the concept of a respectively singly 
existing present moment, we must be able to account for the transition 
from one such present moment to another. And, therefore, we have to 
take into account various moments, namely successive ones (as we are 
able to say based upon the expertise of our durational experience). Hence, 
continuity in turn requires the reference to the interplay of many moments 
and, hence, to some kind of temporal extension (such as, for instance, the 
Bergsonian structure of qualitative multiplicity is able to provide). The 
result of our consideration of the conception of Time and Free Will is that 
tense and temporal extension are linked in a strikingly tight manner.
Conclusion
In section three we saw that with a view to contemporary philosophy of 
temporal experience, but even more strikingly to contemporary metaphysics 
of time, it could seem that the features of tense and temporal extension are 
hardly combinable. Against this background, the most popular approaches 
of temporal ontology — namely A-theoretic presentism and B-theoretic 
eternalism — can be understood as representing the two horns of the dilemma: 
one conceiving tense without temporal extension and the other giving up 
tense in favour of temporal extension. I suggested to take Bergson’s analysis 
of temporal experience as an alternative basis for philosophical reflection 
about time since here, by construing temporal extension on a qualitative 
level instead of a numerical one, Bergson reflects both features as combinable 
and even belonging together in his notion of “qualitative multiplicity.”
48 Bergsoniana N°1 | 2021
The crucial question is, however, if this conception could and/or should be 
transferred to the objective description of temporal reality as well. As we saw, 
Bergson’s approach of Time and Free Will that decidedly avoids such a transfer 
remains dissatisfying because the radical attempt of thinking the outside 
world as tensed but non-extended fails due to an essential lack of continuity 
and, hence, in the final analysis, an incomprehensibility of tense itself.
This result is highly interesting because it reveals the solidarity of tense 
and temporal extension on an even profounder level than just the fact 
that we observe both within our natural experience. It now seems that 
tense is possibly even metaphysically dependent on temporal extension. 
If this proves true, it is, to begin with, an interesting challenge that every 
presentist must deal with.
As for Bergson’s own philosophy, the result makes clear why we cannot 
remain satisfied by the (metaphysical) position provided by Time and Free 
Will. Rather, there is — plainly for structural reasons — a legitimate interest 
in establishing a metaphysical position that takes succession, being structured 
by qualitative multiplicity, not only as occurring within the duration of the 
inner consciousness but to be an objective feature of the world itself. How 
Bergson fulfils this task in his later works Matter and Memory and Creative 
Evolution remains to be presented on another occasion.
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Abstract: The article confronts Bergson’s Time and Free Will with ontological models 
of temporal reality from analytic time metaphysics, such as presentism, eternalism etc. 
I maintain that tense (and hence a changing “now”) and temporal extension are crucial 
features for understanding successive structure within our temporal experience. In the 
context of analytic metaphysics following McTaggart, however, tense and extension fall 
under the suspicion that they are not consistent with each other. I show Bergson’s concept 
of “Qualitative Multiplicity” to open a new perspective on the issue: being introduced as 
a qualitative and hence not countable or measurable feature, it enables an understanding 
of temporal extension that differs radically from spatial extension. Following this, we 
can understand Bergson’s durational realm of the conscious I as temporally extended in 
qualitative but not numerical respect — which, in turn, is unproblematically consistent 
with tense. A second issue of the article is a critical reflection on the conception of the 
external world established in Time and Free Will: I maintain that it is not problem-free 
to conceive any part of reality as merely tensed and not at all temporally extended. I 
conclude this to be a strong motivation for expanding further the idea of “Qualitative 
Multiplicity.”
Keywords: metaphysic of time, temporal experience, presentism, eternalism, continuity.
Résumé : L’article confronte L’Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience de Bergson 
aux modèles ontologiques de la réalité temporelle issus de la métaphysique analytique 
du temps, tels que le présentisme, l’éternalisme, etc. Je soutiens que le temps compris 
comme “tense” (et donc un ’maintenant’ changeant) et l’extension temporelle sont des 
caractéristiques cruciales pour comprendre la structure successive dans notre expérience 
temporelle. Dans le contexte de la métaphysique analytique suivant McTaggart, 
cependant, le temps (tense) et l’extension sont soupçonnés de ne pas être cohérents l’un 
avec l’autre. Je présente le concept de “multiplicité qualitative” de Bergson pour ouvrir 
une nouvelle perspective sur la question : Introduit comme une caractéristique qualitative 
et donc non dénombrable ou mesurable, il permet une compréhension de l’extension 
temporelle qui diffère radicalement de l’extension spatiale. En suivant cela, nous pouvons 
comprendre le domaine duratif du Moi conscient de Bergson comme étant étendu 
temporellement de manière qualitative mais non numérique - ce qui, à son tour, est 
cohérent avec le temps (tense). Le deuxième point de l’article est une réflexion critique 
sur la conception du monde extérieur donnée par L’Essai sur les données immédiates de 
la conscience : je maintiens qu’il est problématique de concevoir toute partie de la réalité 
comme simplement “tensed” et pas du tout étendue temporellement. J’en conclus qu’il 
faudrait donc développer davantage l’idée de “multiplicité qualitative.”
Mots-clés : métaphysique du temps, expériences temporelle, présentisme, éternalisme, 
continuité.
